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Abstract
The understanding of the micro-macro link is an urgent
need in the study of social systems. The complex adap-
tive nature of social systems adds to the challenges of un-
derstanding social interactions and system feedback and
presents substantial scope and potential for extending the
frontiers of computer-based research tools such as simula-
tions and agent-based technologies. In this project, we seek
to understand key research questions concerning the inter-
play of ethical trust at the individual level and the devel-
opment of collective social moral norms as representative
sample of the bigger micro-macro link of social systems. We
outline our Computational Model of Ethical Trust (CMET)
informed by research findings from trust, machine ethics
and neural science. Guided by the CMET architecture, we
discuss key implementation ideas for the simulations of eth-
ical trust and social moral norms.
1. Introduction
It is a widely acknowledged concern that the micro-
macro link (thereafter known as M-M link) or multi-level
analysis constitutes a fundamental discussion in the study
of sociology and social systems. This M-M issue or con-
cern is also a concern in multi-agent system (MAS) simu-
lation especially from the perspective of distributed artifi-
cial intelligence (DAI) where agency coordination and scal-
ability can become problematic [51]. At the macro level of
the M-M link, concerns are also framed in terms of emer-
gence of macro phenomena from individual actions; emer-
gence of structure; and emergence of norms from individ-
ual beliefs and behaviour. At the micro level, concerns
are framed in terms of social causation as well as whether
macro effects are transferred uniformly to all individuals
or whether they are transferred in a non-uniform manner
(See [61, 51, 50, 22]). Along these concerns are other
related concerns of top-down or bottom-up influence for
example do institutions influence individual behaviours or
individual behaviours influence institutions?[12]; structure
versus agency; and actor versus network debates. These di-
chotomies have very similar veins in that it all concerns the
interplay of levels.
In order to gain a better understanding of the interplay of
levels, our group have selected to investigate the interplay of
individual ethical trust and collective social moral norms as
a representative sample of the bigger M-M concern of social
systems. We advocate the use of agent-based simulation as
appropriate computer-based research tools that can mediate
and help shed light in a bi-level analysis.
We see a form of moral reasoning comprising the ethical
or moral consideration of others and a willingness to ac-
cept the risk by exercising trust. We see this form of ethical
trust mapping to the notion of a “leap of faith” as mentioned
by [37] and influcenced by the “sociation” process of [54].
Hence, the research questions that our project seeks to un-
derstand are:
• How can computer-based investigative techniques (for
example agent-based computing and simulation) assist
in the understanding of the interplay of ethical trust
behaviors at the individual and the group level?
• How information processing affect moral judgement
and actions?
• How do moral judgments and actions at the individual
level affect the collective social moral norms? When
does one’s moral action become a collective moral
norm for a group? and does a group moral norm con-
straint decision and behavior at the individual level?
Section 2 reviews important research on trust and ma-
chine ethics and highlight the significance of simulation
and agent-based modelling paradigms for the investigation
of this M-M link. Section 3 outlines the conceptual no-
tion of a bio-inspired Computational Model of Ethical Trust
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(CMET). Based on this two-tier architecture, salient aspects
of the agent-based model design considerations are dis-
cussed. Key features of this project are bio-inspired neural
agent-based processes in ethical trust reasoning and in the
evolution of social moral norms. Section 4 provides con-
cluding discussions that lead to works including the appli-
cation of CMET to investigate the interplay of ethical trust
and moral norms.
2. Selected works
Here we analyze selected developments in trust and
ethics research.
2.1. Trust and ethics research
According to Luhmann, “trust is a basic fact of life” and
“to show trust is to anticipate the future” [30]. For sure,
trust and ethics are necessary for social order and hence the
effective functioning of social systems [30, 27, 20]. They
have received active attention of researchers in many differ-
ent fields. For good overview on trust, see [54, 30, 27, 39,
38, 48, 26, 32]. For overview of both eastern and western
ethics, see [59, 60, 41, 62].
Two important developments are noted as trust and ethics
research mature. First is the framing of trust and ethics as
multi-dimensional constructs where researchers introduced
the social, affective, emotional and computational dimen-
sions of trust and moral judgments in the attempt to ar-
rive at a deeper understanding (See [27, 10, 33, 6, 26, 23]).
The other development is machine ethics research. Machine
ethics is a field of study that is concerned with the ethical
behaviours of machines towards human and other machines.
Recent research in machine ethics include ethical reasoning
and computational ethics (See [31, 4, 35, 5]) and suggest
that, in addition to traditional philosophical inquiry, a com-
putational approach for ethics is emerging.
2.2. Significance
These developments together with advances in simula-
tion and agent-based technologies are important aspects of
research findings. On the one hand, they inform us on
modelling of “sociability” aspects of social systems namely
the social interactions and the system feedback; and on the
other hand, simulation and agent-based technologies pro-
vide the required modelling tools to model and study the
intended social systems. According to [44], “Simulation is
a ground-breaking tool to study the core problem of the mi-
cro/macro relations”.
From these seminal papers of ‘ascribing mental quali-
ties to machines’ [34] and ‘agent-orient programming’ [53]
to Axelrod’s view of simulation research as the ‘third way
of doing science’ [9], the synergistic link (in terms of
object-oriented usefulness and ease of computer experimen-
tations) between simulation and agent-based paradigm can
be mapped. As a result, agent-based simulation received
popular attention from researchers working in diverse fields
and disciplines (See [19, 17, 9, 24, 43, 63, 47, 55, 15]). We
see simulation and agent-based modelling as a useful tool
for the study of ethical trust and social moral norms within
social systems. We subscribe to the three reasons [25] gave
as to why agent-based modelling software and simulation is
easy to use:
1. Agent-based simulation provides insight and intuition;
2. Agent-based simulation forces us to think more clearly
about our problems;
3. Simulation allows us to perform experiments that
would be difficult or impossible to perform on real sub-
jects;
In addition, relative to the context of ethical trust modelling,
we offer two other important considerations, namely:
4. Agent-based simulation allows us to test sociological
theories;
5. Agent-based simulation facilitates the adaptive learn-
ing for complex adaptive system;
The findings from these research confirmed the appropriate-
ness of agent-based simulation for investigations of com-
plex adaptive systems, wherein social systems are prime
candidates. Hence, it is the strengths of agent-based simu-
lation combined with elements of bio-inspired neural agent-
based processes that lead us to adopt the agent-based mod-
elling approach for the development of a computational
model of ethical trust (CMET). This model will be used
to investigate the interplay of ethical trust and social moral
norms.
3. Computational model of ethical trust
(CMET)
We present the design considerations of CMET to allow
simulation and investigations of the interplay of individual
ethical trust and collective social moral norms.
3.1. Bio-inspired CMET architecture
A series of neural-related research inform and inspire our
CMET model design. These developments include:
• The generic neuron network. The neuron is a brain cell
that has functional control over many of our physical
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and cognitive activities. The term neuron was coined
in 1891 by Heinrich Wilhelm Gottfired von Waldeyer-
Hartz and later, Cajal established the neuron doctrine
and the principle of connection specificity. Artificial
neural networks (ANN) are the computerized coun-
terpart of the bio-based neurons. ANN is useful for
pattern recognition and classifications. This ANN and
MAS is deployed in tier-1 of CMET. (For overview on
these areas see [11, 18, 29]).
• The mirror neuron system (MNS) comprising ‘canoni-
cal neuron’ and ‘mirror neuron’ are equipped with mir-
roring and adaptive learning abilities. (See [45, 46,
16]). In particular, the features of the shared mani-
fold hypothesis [16] – wherein the canonical neuron
simulates the “best programmed plan” and provides a
copy to the mirror neuron for action have strong influ-
ence on the CMET design. This idea is closely related
to other recent studies in the area of theories of mind
(ToM). ToM suggest that we “mind read” social situa-
tions and this ability allow us to form a mental model
within us (See [16, 1]; this idea that we carry ‘a small-
scale mental model of the real world inside our head’
is also mentioned by Craik, Simmel and Bandura (see
[54, 64, 10]). We use this mental model to reason and
evaluate, to empathize and thereafter to form and to
project social judgments. This form of mental model
can be perceived as a form of system feedback and map
closely to Rosen’s anticipatory system. This idea is
modelled at tier-2 of CMET.
• Recent neural research findings suggest that social
and moral reasoning are related to various areas of
the human brain - “a network of brain regions” (See
[7, 3, 42]). In addition, [21] suggest that moral think-
ing involve two types of processes: “domain-specific,
social-emotional responses and domain-neutral rea-
soning processes”.
Based on these considerations, the CMET architecture is
designed as a two-tier architecture as shown in Figure 1.
Tier-1 in CMET models the ethical trust reasoning and tier-
2 addresses the collective social moral norms. (For a more
detailed discussion on CMET and its components see [28])
3.2. From CMET to agent-based simulation
We cite two studies: one on moral norms by [52] and
the other on the promotion of norms by [8] as a start and a
departure point for our discussion on the moral norms sim-
ulation. Both studies employed a behaviorial perspective
towards norms.
For [52],
Figure 1. CMET 2-Tier Architecture.
“The relationship of moral norms to behavior de-
pends upon how a person defines the moral choice
situation. If a person construes a decision he faces
to be a moral choice, relevant moral norms he
holds are likely to be activated and to affect his
behavior” ( [52]: p 355).
For [8],
“A norm exists in a given social setting to the ex-
tent that individuals usually act in a certain way
and are often punished when seen not to be acting
in this way” ( [8]: p 47”)
We can say that the study by [52] is a traditional social
science study that follows closely to the “deductivism” path
(for a discussion of different research methodologies, see
[2]) while [8] uses evolutionary game theoretic approach in
a simulation to study how “norms can change over time or to
the growth and decay of norms” ([8]: p 47). The approach
taken can be summarized as follows:
Develop Model – Model the relationship of moral norms
with suitable independent variables;
Measure or Simulate – Measure the independent vari-
ables as ordinal data type or simulate the rules or the
decision-making processes to derive the strategies and
values for the ordinal data type;
Apply Adaptation – Deploy learning, adaptation or evolu-
tionary algorithms;
Observe Pattern – Observe for patterns and interactions;
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For our project, we deploy this approach and in addition
to a behavior-based definition of “moral norms”, we include
selected key social processes as discussed in the next sec-
tion.
3.3. Discussion
The issues of micro-macro effects and macro-micro im-
pacts within social systems are closely related to the notions
of emergence, downward causation and sociation. Accord-
ing to [54] “. . . it is sociation which synthesizes all human
interests, contents and processes into concrete unit” ([54]:
p 4). These sociation processes include social interactions,
learning and adaptation. Hence, in most social systems,
on the one hand, when agents interact at the micro level,
based on social signals, protocols and rules, macro phenom-
ena such as formation of institution or behavior patterns at
the collective level can be observed, giving rise to notion
of “emergence” and these macro phenomena once formed,
can in turn impact or constrain individual agent’s behav-
iors through rules, conventions, norms, cases or law. (For
more discussion on emergence and downward causation,
see [14, 15, 40, 49]). Our project models key “sociation”
processes in the form of social interaction, cognizance and
information processing such as the effects as well as the ac-
ceptance of social information. An example of the effects of
social information is the impact of sanctions and an exam-
ple of the acceptance of social information is the agreement
or transfer or copying of social beliefs. These processes
are supported by key implementation ideas of “demons and
agent ensemble grouping”. We see these ideas being opera-
tionalized as follows:
Demons and MAS. Agents in the MAS will be equipped
with“demon-like capabilities” for the selection and de-
ployment of simulation parameters such as rules and
variables. The idea of “demon” was first introduced
circa 1872 by James Clark Maxwell as a form of
thought experiment on issues of heat flow and the
second law of thermodynamics. This idea was later
popularized by [57] and is now commonly known as
Maxwell’s demons. Maxwell’s demon is an imaginary
“being with certain well-defined powers of actions”
([58]: p 126) and as part of his thought experiment,
Maxwell conceived of this demon as a “sorting de-
mon” who guarded the trapdoor between two contain-
ers and will open the trapdoor to allow a faster trav-
elling molecules to pass through from one side to the
other (See [13, 56]). [36] also used the idea of “de-
mon” as “recognition-agents (that) lurk silently; to in-
tervene only in certain circumstances” ([36]: p 274).
CMET will have agents with “demon-like” roles to al-
low agents to be able to response to changing roles
and environment, for example to allow for additional
rules, meta-rules or different combinations of inde-
pendent variables. When an agent encounters a given
case, it “looks” out for the feature that belongs to his
own class. Once the agent “observes” this feature, he
will “broadcasts” his observation. The other agent will
“listen” to the “broadcast” and based on the “loud-
est broadcasts”, it will select and assigned the set of
rules or “generics” to the corresponding level within
the simulation.
Ethical trust reasoning. Tier-1 will provide for an ethi-
cal knowledge base that will aid in the development
of rules for decision-making. The underlying mecha-
nisms are designed as neural-based network and rule-
based system (See Figure 2). These mechanisms will
provide the required decision-making and rules during
the simulation. This neural network rule-based system
is differentiated from the evolutionary game theory ap-
proach deployed in [8]. We deploy this approach as
an initial effort to allow for context-related, social in-
fluences and certain level of pragmatism to be exoge-
nously modeled instead of endogenous accommoda-
tion within a game-theoretic pay-off matrix. In this
sense, this approach may be considered to be more
contextualized and behavioral then the game-theoretic
approach. Tier-1 architecture can be further improved
to incorporate role-playing games and to collect real
time data. This will allow for more realistic represen-
tation and a move towards the trend of participatory
simulation.
Social moral norms Tier-2 allows for operationalization
of models with changing independent variables and
rules. This is inspired by the concept of mirror neu-
ron system (MNS) found in human system. Agents
will be equipped with the roles of “canonical and mir-
ror” neurons and will allow for copying and forming
of collective moral practices. Tier-2 will include moral
norms visualiser (MNV). Underpinning this notion of
the MNV is the working mechanisms of MNS as well
as the concept of an ensemble of agents and models.
Each MNV agent has an ensemble of three types of
agents namely the MNS agent - this is the agent sub-
system that translates the moral judgment from a men-
tal state to a defined state as well build a mental model
to allow for second order system feedback; the ethical
output (EO) agent - this agent contains cases as out-
put from the tier-1 of CMET; and the memory (MEM)
agent - contains the rules for adaptive learning and in-
teractions. This agent ensemble grouping is shown in
Figure 3
21548
Figure 2. Neural Network and MAS.
Figure 3. Agent Ensemble Grouping.
4. Conclusion
Neural mechanisms from the study of neural science and
human brain have excellent properties that inspire design
of computational models of ethical trust. Specifically the
generic neuron network can be used for classification of
rules and cases; MAS with “demon” capabilities allows
for case recognition and management while agent ensemble
grouping that support a “mirror neuron-like” system can be
mapped for the modelling of ethical trust reasoning and for
the study of social moral norms. We believe that such inspi-
rations can be extended to other computational systems.
Agent-based modelling and simulation with its strong
link to object-oriented paradigm is a useful tool for the
study of micro-macro concerns of social systems. Beyond
the initial investigations, it also allows testing and validating
of essential social theories. We believe that an appropriate
and cautious deployment of agent ensemble coupled with
chosen simulation techniques can serve as another avenue
of research and allow for model-to-model comparison. Due
to space limitation, this area of model-to-model comparison
was not addressed in this paper. However, we acknowledge
that it is an important area to be addressed in future research
work.
We are now in the phase of refining our model. This in-
cludes development of the simulation rules, variables’ rep-
resentation, cases and ethical knowledge base. The next
phase is running the simulation and analyzing the outcomes.
These results will be reported once they are available.
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